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Implementation of EU Agri-Environmental Measures at the Regional 







In this paper we apply a political objective function approach developed by Salhofer and Glebe 
(2004) to explain the high variability of agri-environmental program implementation at the EU 
regional level. The analysis covers 55 EU regions during the period 2001-2002, using basic data 
extracted from the Common Monitoring Indicators collected by the UE Commission for the 
programme’s evaluation process. The main results indicate that the area covered by agri-
environmental programs increases in regions where budget constraints are less severe and where the 
social demand for environmental amenities is more relevant. Moreover, agri-environmental programs 
are negatively related to the participation opportunity cost and show a non linear relation with the 
farmer’s political weight.  
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The diversity of EU rural areas with regard to natural landscape, agricultural production systems 
and the capacity to retain, and attract, population is a matter of fact. As a consequence, most EU 
countries have implemented Rural Development Programmes (RDPs) at the regional level. Therefore 
regions, under national budget constraints, are key decision units in the implementation of rural 
development measures. For this reason, the most suitable level to analyse the uptake of EU RDPs is 
the regional one. 
Agri-environmental commitments, the most important measures in terms of rural development 
budget expenditure (more than two billion Euro in the year 2000), have been implemented in every 
EU member State at both the national and regional levels. The regulations of these schemes - EC 
2078/92 and measure F of EC 1257/99 - allow member states a wide margin of action, so the results of 
their application, particularly in terms of covered area, differ widely over the EU territory.  
The purpose of this paper is to explain the high variability of agri-environmental program 
implementation at the regional level from a political economy perspective. The underlying idea is that 
the strong increase in agricultural funding channelled through agri-environmental programs in the EU 
reflect, at least partially,  the fact that this programs are largely viewed as a trade-friendly way to 
transfer income to farmers, while at the same time responding to growing pressure from expanding 
social environmental concerns (see Baylis at al., 2004). Thus, politicians in choosing the optimal level 
of agri-environmental funds face a trade off between the welfare weight given to farm income, vis à 
vis that given to the public concern, under standard budget constraints.  
We test this general prediction following the conceptual framework recently proposed by Salhofer 
K. and Glebe T. (2004). These authors have developed a model of countries’ political objective 
function that identifies several determinants of the extent to which agri-environmental measures are 
implemented, such as environmental benefits, farmer participation opportunity costs, budget 
constraints, farmer political weight, and so on. However, we depart from these authors with respect to 
the level of application of the empirical analysis. In fact, instead of testing the model’s prediction at   3
the member state level, we implement the model at the regional level, on the grounds that in most EU 
countries the RDPs are formulated and implemented by such institutional units.   
The remainder of the paper is organised so that Section 2 presents a synthetic overview of the EU 
agri-environmental programs, focusing on the level of implementation at national or regional  levels; 
Section 3 reports some theoretical remark; Section 4 describes the utilised data and the empirical 
specification, Section 5 discusses the main empirical results. 
 
2. Agri-environmental measures in European regions 
Agri-environmental measures are policy instruments targeted at development and support for 
more environmental-friendly agriculture methods and protection of the European countryside. 
These measures include a series of schemes, generally farmer addressed, based on the reduction 
of agriculture impact on the environment (input reduction, organic farming, conversion of arable land 
to grassland, biodiversity, animal welfare, sustainable and extensive systems etc.) and rural land 
management (maintenance of the countryside and landscape features). 
Farmers who join agri-environmental programmes for at least five years are supported by an 
annual payment, calculated on the basis of the foregone income and the additional costs  resulting 
from the given commitment. The payment is based on the area of the holdings to which the 
commitment applies, under the constraint of a maximum premium per hectare fixed by legislation.  
Obviously participation in such programs is voluntary, and payment is made for commitment that 
goes beyond usual ‘good farm’ practices. In this way the farmers are free to develop an environmental 
consciousness and strengthen their role in protecting the rural environment, and contribute to the 
maintenance of the attractiveness and viability of rural areas. 
Agri-environmental measures began in some European countries in the ‘80s, but it was only in 
1992 that the European Community introduced them as an “accompany measure” to CAP reform, with 
the objective of reducing intensive agriculture impact on the environment and improving 
environmental quality
1. 
Since 1999 agri-environment schemes have been included by “Agenda 2000” CAP reform into 
Rural Development Policy, a unique framework in which the Community supports sustainable rural 
development. All Rural Development measures are incorporated in the RDPs that apply to all EU 
member states. 
The agri-environmental schemes in the RDPs were drawn up for every European country, at the 
geographical level deemed to be the most appropriate
2. Thus agri-environmental schemes can be 
tailored to different agronomic, environmental, political and economical situations. 
Some states have implemented the schemes at the national level, while others produced regional 
programmes. At the former level we find France, Ireland, Sweden, Austria, Netherlands, Greece, 
Denmark and Luxembourg. Instead Germany, Italy, Belgium and the United Kingdom chose, in 
relation to their institutional differences, to apply the  agri-environmental schemes regionally. 
Germany and Italy with their respective 16 länder and 21 regions worked out a programme for each, 
whereas the United Kingdom’s 4 programmes are for England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland; 
Belgium has 2 programmes, one for the Flemish Region and the other for the Walloon Region. 
In a few cases, the states have simultaneously presented national and regional programmes for 
particular regions that prefer autonomy. This is the case of Spain with its national agri-environmental 
programme, with the exception of Navarra and the Basque Country that each have their own 
programmes, and of Finland and Portugal where there is a programme for the continental portion of 
the state and specific plans for the Aland Islands, and Madeira and the Azores Islands. 
Over the whole EU-15, there has been the design of 59 RDPs involving agri-environmental 
schemes. It is important to note that the member states were obliged to provide for agri-environmental 
measures throughout their territories
3. Thus agri-environmental measures are the only measures the 
member state or region must include in its rural development plan, all other measures are optional. 
                                                 
1 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2078/92 of 30 June 1992 
2 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1257/99 of 17 May 1999 article 41 
3 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1257/99 of 17 May 1999 article 43   4
Agri-environment payment is co-financed by the EU and the member states. Until the 2003 Mid-
Term Review the share from the EU budget was 75 % in Objective 1 areas (less developed regions) 
and 50 % in other areas, it is now respectively 85% and 60%.  
In all the RDPs the agri-environmental measures, like the other ‘accompanying measures’, are co-
financed by the EAGGF-Guarantee fund. The total financial resources allocated to agri-environment 
also comprises a national co-financed share and possible state aid. 
The amount of EU budget spending on agri-environment measures is shown in Figure 1. After 
2000 the amount includes the Agenda 2000 measures and old 2078/92 EC Regulation payments, 
started before 1999 (commitments are quinquennial). Note the slight fall that occurred at the beginning 
of the Rural Development Regulation due to its initial slow application. 
 



























Source: EAGGF-Guarantee section, budget execution. 
 
The share of the EAGGF Guarantee Rural Development Budget covered by the agri-
environmental measures varies significantly among the  member states (see Figure 2). 
Compared with the EU-15 ‘average share’ of less than 50% of the EAGGF-Guarantee Rural 
Development  budget dedicated to agri-environmental measures, we find Sweden with almost 90% 
and Austria and Italy
4 with more than 60% of the budget concentrated on agri-environment. Other 
countries like France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Spain show a share of 30% or less; the percentage 
of Greece is well under 10%. These data reflect, in addition to geographical and economical variables, 
the differing farmer attitude towards agri-environment among member states. 
Besides budget share, it is also important to consider the quota of utilised agricultural area 
covered by agri-environment measures.  
Also in this case wide differences are evident among the member states: Sweden, Luxembourg, 
Finland and Austria apply agri-environment extensively over a surface larger than 80% of the utilised 
agricultural area, whereas in the United Kingdom, Belgium, Denmark, Italy and Spain the share is 
between 10% and 15%. In France the share is 40%, while in Netherlands and Greece is under 5%. EU 
average is about 25%.
5 
 The average premium per hectare is different among EU member states (see Figure 3). 
                                                 
4 Italy’s percentage is influenced by many Objective1 areas which, as in other states, only accompany measures 
co-financed by the EAGGF-Guarantee fund, while other measures are co-financed by the EAGGF-Guidance 
fund. 
5 DG Agriculture, Common Indicators for monitoring Rural Development Programming 2002    5
In France, Sweden, Austria and Finland the large surface of the scheme’s application is offset by a 
small unit premium. On the other hand the Netherlands, Greece, Italy, Belgium and the United 
Kingdom have a higher premium per hectare. It is to be noted that maximum ceilings fixed by Rural 
Development Regulations apply with regard to the types of measures and crops.  
 
Fig. 2: Share of agri-environmental measures in rural development expenditure (EAGGF-

















































Source: EAGGF-Guarantee section, budget execution 
 











































Source: DG Agriculture, Common Indicators for monitoring Rural Development Programming (years 
2001,2002 and 2003) 
                                                 
6 For Sweden we report the average premium 2001-2002   6
 
 
3. Theoretical remarks 
This section gives a synthetic overview of the approach developed by Salhofer and Glebe (2004), 
also taking into consideration some recent developments in political economy models applied to the 
EU decision-making process. The starting point of the Salhofer and Glebe (hereafter S-G) model is the 
hypothesis that each EU member state tries to maximize national welfare instead of EU welfare, an 
assumption not so far from reality, at least in the context of agri-environmental policy where most 
contention tends to be country specific 
7. Thus, national welfare can be expressed by the well noted 
weighted linear welfare function: 
 
W = UN(D) + δ UF(D),            (1)         
  
 
where Ui is the welfare of the farmer (F) and non-farmer (N), while δ represents the weight the 
government attaches to farmer welfare. From a positive point of view, this objective function 
represents a reduced-form model called ‘political preference function’ where the political weight δ 
reflects rent-seeking ability (Bullock, 1994) or the political support (Swinnen, 1994) of the farmer 
group. 
The comparative static results of the S-G model are obtained by maximising relation (1) subjected 
to economic and environmental constraints. In brief, economic constraint is modelled assuming that 
the slope, b, of the farmer’s marginal private costs to participate in the agri-environmental scheme is 
constant.
8 Moreover, the marginal social benefit, c, of agri-environmental programs is assumed to be a 
constant. Then, under taxpayer budget constraints that take into consideration the co-financed nature 
of agri-environmental programs, and the national contribution t to the EU budget, the S-G model 
characterizes the optimal area, A
*, to be covered by agri-environmental programs.  
Comparative static results show that the optimal area (A
*)
 is positively linked to the social benefit 
of the program (c), and the political weight government attaches to farm income (δ), being negatively 
linked to program participation costs (b), the economic and political costs of budget expenditure (λ) 
and the country’s share in the EU budget (t).  
The implementation of this theoretical framework at the regional level instead of the national, as 
in this study, offers one main advantage, apart from the reasons discussed in the previous section. The 
main advantages lie in the fact that the degree of freedom of the empirical model will increase 
significantly, giving the possibility of controlling for unobserved differences in the countries such as 
differences in political institutions. In fact, both theoretical and empirical evidence shows that political 
institutional factors strongly affect the political economy equilibrium (Henning, 2004; Olper and 
Raimondi, 2004). Thus, considering this last situation, the empirical model we estimate can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
A
* = F(c, δ, b, λ, t, z)                 ( 2 )  
 
where the variable z is a vector of country dummies to control for any unspecified country 
heterogeneity such as political institutions. Note that with country fixed effects included, any non-
specified country differences, will be controlled for. Moreover, the inclusion of country fixed effects 
could control for the different RDPs territorial applications. In fact, the overlapping of territorial units 
of RDPs programmes and regions differ from state to state, sometimes coinciding with the regional 
border, sometimes comprising more than one region or even involving the whole nation.  
                                                 
7 Generally speaking, this assumption is quite common in political economy application to the CAP. However, 
more recent tentatives to formalize the CAP decision making process progressively depart from this simplified 
assumption (see Henning, 2004; and Pokrivcak and Swinnen, 2004). 
8 The underlying logic is that rational farmers first allocate to agri-environment measures land with low 
productivity, and then land with high productivity. Thus, the marginal costs are increasing in allocated land 
under agri-environment measures.     7
 
 
4. Data and empirical specification 
To explain the main economic and political constraints on the implementation of agri-
environmental measures we use data from about 55 EU regions during the period 2001-2002. The 
basic data come from the EUROSTAT Regio database and RDP common monitoring indicators 
(CMI), collected by the EU Commission for the programme’s evaluation process. 
From all the 67 RDPs implemented in the EU during the considered period, our analysis covers all 
the 59 RDP containing agri-environmental measures. With regard to the time span the processed 
observations refer to the year 2001, the first year of CMI implementation, and to 2002. The lack of 
2002 data reduced the number of total observations from 118 to 108.   
The dependent variable (A) is extracted from the CMI. It measures the regional rate of 
implementation of agri-environmental schemes with regard to the area under the old commitments of 
EC 2078/92, plus the area under measure F of EC 1257/99. The rate of implementation of agri-
environmental measure is expressed as a percentage of the utilised agricultural area plus forest surface, 
taken from EUROSTAT Regio database. 
The main determinants of the extent to which agri-environmental measures are implemented refer 
to the farmers’ income political weight, opportunity costs of participation, regional budget constraints, 
growth rate and environmental benefits. 
The proxy of the farmers’ political weight is based on the EU Commission publication ‘Study on 
the impact of community agricultural policies on economic and social cohesion’ (2000). Starting from 
these data we constructed a measure of farmer political weight (agwtot) using the total regional 
transfer to the agricultural sector (price support plus direct and other payments) as a share of the 
regional agricultural gross value added at basic prices. 
Farmer adhesion to agri-environmental commitments involves a fall in their production linked to 
input reduction. This fall can be expressed as an opportunity cost, which is more consistent in the high 
productivity areas. Thus the yield of a common crop like wheat (soft and durum) is an adequate 
parameter to obtain a proxy of the farmers opportunity cost at the regional/national level (yield).  
The ‘regional contribution’ to the whole EU budget is proxy by the share of regional GDP on 
EU15 GDP for the year 2001 and 2002. In order to smooth the strong regional/national size 
differences we express such variables in a logarithmic form (budget).  
The regional/national budgetary pressure linked to the adhesion to agri-environmental measure is 
strictly related to the public budget deficit. Due to the lack of data on the regional deficits, the 
budgetary pressure variable is based on the regional growth rate (growth), expressed as the five year 
average before 2001 and 2002.  
The environmental benefits, associated with the implementation of the agri-environmental 
measure (beds), is captured by the rate of beds in hotels and similar establishments per inhabitant.  
However, because this variable only imperfectly captures the social demand for environmental 
goods, we also include in the empirical model the per-capita GDP (gdppc), on the grounds that social 
demand for environmental amenities is connected to economic welfare.  Table (1) reports a statistics 
summary of the explanatory variable described above.  
Thus, taking into account the variables described above, and the possibility of testing some 
second order approximations and interaction terms between variables, our preferred specification 
assumes the following form:  
 
it it it it
it it it it m it
gdppc beds growth
budget yield agwtot agwtot z A
ε ν µ τ
λ γ β β α
+ + + +
+ + + + + =
* * *
* * * *
2
1         (3) 
 
where the subscript i and t refer to regions and years; α is a common intercept; zm are country 
fixed effects; and finally β, β1, γ, λ, τ, µ, ν are the unknown parameters to be estimated, while ε is an 
unobserved error term.  
   8
5. Results and discussion 
Table 2 shows the ordinary least squares regressions of two different specifications based on 
equation (3). We begin the discussion from the results of Regression (1) that do not include the 
country’ fixed effects. The model as a whole is significant, but explain a quite low level of the cross-
region variation in the agri-environmental programs application (Adj R
2 = 0.22). However, all the 
explanatory variables, but one, are significant at 5% or 10% level.  More specifically, in line with the 
Salhofer and Glebe’s result, the area under agri-environmental programs is negatively related to the 
opportunity cost of program implementation (yield) and positive related to the demand of 
environmental benefits (beds and  gdppc) and with the level of contribution to the EU budget (budget). 
Differently, the link between agri-environmental intensity and the political weight given to farmer’s 
income is positive but not in a linear fashion: an increase in the farmer’s political weight induce a less 
than proportional increase of area under agri-environmental programs. 
An interesting question is now to understand what happens if we include country fixed effects to 
control for unobserved countries heterogeneity, such as institutions. This is shown in regression 2 of 
Table 2. With country fixed effects included, the explanatory power of the empirical model increase 
substantially (Adj R
2 = 0.50). This result suggests that the explanatory power of the unobserved effects 
is substantial. Furthermore, and most interesting, all the coefficients maintain their previous sign and 
are for the most part estimated with more precision (higher t-value). Finally, the coefficient of the 
growth variable albeit non significantly now have a positive sign in line with the a-priory expectation. 
Thus, overall, the results give credence to the Salhofer and Glebe’s conceptual framework but, at the 
same time, call for a more formal treatment of country differences, here proxy by dummy variables.  
Now let us turn to the interpretation of our empirical evidence. We start from the main deviation 
to the Salhofer and Glebe’s results, namely the non linear link between  the farmer political weight and 
the area covered by agri-environmental programs. Specifically, a positive coefficient in the linear term 
and a negative one in the square, suggests that in regions with a low level of  farmer political weight, 
an increase in this variable induce an increase in the are under agri-environmental programs. However, 
this relationship turn out to be negative once a moderate amount of farmer political weight has been 
achieved. Thus, because the farmer political weight variable is proxy by the share of total regional 
CAP transfer to gross value added in agriculture, the non linear relationship simply tend to suggest 
that there is not a perfect spatial overlapping between traditional CAP transfers and the environmental 
measures. To simplify, the result tend to suggests that the redistributive effect of agri-environmental 
programs are only partially linked with the old CAP redistributive effects. 
As in the Salhofer and Glebe’s empirical analysis, the regional (national) contribution to the 
overall EU budget (budget) shows a different sign compared to the a priori expectation. The discrete 
number of observation (108) used in our analysis, compared to the 30 used in their study, suggest that 
the supposition that data limitation are driving their results, are not supported by our figure.  
Thus, our empirical result seems to confirm the failure of the so-called ‘restaurant table effect’, 
namely the tendency of the CAP decision-making process to over protect agriculture, supporting the 
Pakrivcak, et al. (2001) model. However, note that because our budget proxy is measured at regional 
level, the link between regional GDP and EU budget is only indirect, so this conclusion has to keep 
with caution.  
Areas under agri-environment commitment also vary in relation to the environmental benefit 
variables beds and gdppc, thus an increase in these proxy variables leads to an increase in the area 
covered by the schemes. Therefore agri-environmental measures can contribute to rural land 
management and can help maintain rural landscape features, in order to strengthen agricultural 
provision for non-trade goods and the landscape amenities more and more requested by the richest 
countries. 
Finally the regional growth rate, as a proxy of extra cost for public funds, shows the right sign 
with direct proportionality between the agri-environmental area and the local growth rate. 
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Table 1 - Summary statistics  
Variable Minimum Mean Maximum St. Dev. 
agwtot 0.035 0.461 1.401 0.258
agwtotsq 0.001 0.278 1.964 0.312
yield 0.800 5.152 9.800 2.282
budget(ln) -3.677 -0.351 2.812 1.409
growth 0.005 0.037 0.116 0.019
beds 0.009 0.039 0.321 0.054






Table 2 – Ordinary least square results  
Variable coefficient p-value coefficient p-value
agwtot 93.10 0.0004 89.10 0.0000
(3.69) (4.56)
agwtotsq -56.71 0.0015 -57.02 0.0004
(-3.26) (-3.68)
yield -2.43 0.0343 -2.58 0.0370
(-2.15) (-2.12)
budget(ln) 2.84 0.0655 2.17 0.0333
(1.86) (2.16)
growth -104.41 0.1603 363.31 0.1050
(1.41) (1.64)
beds 87.76 0.0010 56.61 0.0000
(3.38) (4.61)
gdppc 0.64 0.0773 0.67 0.0254
(1.78) (2.27)
constant -12.88 0.1673 -48.00 0.0037
(-1.39) (-2.98)
National dummies no yes
Obs 108 108
Adj R-squared 0.22 0.50
F-statistic 5.33 6.62
regression 1 regression 2
 
Notes: White’s robust t-statistics given in parentheses   
 
 
 